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Abstract
Through a case study of the UK hospitality and catering
sector, this article explores the limits of employment
law as a means of protecting workers from ill or unfair
treatment. Finding microbreaches of the law to be com-
mon practice in the sector—akin to industry norms or
‘custom and practice’—it considers the routinisation of
these microbreaches as an instance of conflict between
formal legal rules and social norms. The conflict is
problematic because it means that workers are less
likely to perceive breach of their legal rights as an injus-
tice worthy of challenge. The industry norms observed
have been formed under the influence of an asymmetri-
cal distribution of information and power, including
organisational control over the labour process. If
employment law is to be made effective, a realignment
of legal rules with social norms is needed and, at the
same time, the correction of this asymmetry.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Given the prevalence of low-paid, precarious employment in hospitality and catering, the sector
constitutes a privileged entry point from which to examine the effectiveness of employment
law. In the United Kingdom, hospitality work has always been low paid, widely regarded as low
skilled and low status, and lacking any tradition of unionisation and collective bargaining
(Lucas, 2004; Wood, 1992). As such, it has long been considered a sector where employers enjoy
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a wide prerogative to determine terms and conditions unilaterally and where workers are more
vulnerable and in need of the law's protection (Lucas, 1991a). From their creation in the 1940s
until their abolition in 1993, the catering wages boards provided both a floor of rights and
important tripartite mechanisms of regulation and law enforcement (Lucas, 1991b; Radiven &
Lucas, 1997). From 1999, the National Minimum Wage Act (NMWA) was successful in lifting
the wages of a substantial segment of the hospitality labour force a little higher; however, the
statutory minimum was always set at too low a rate to have more than a marginal positive effect
(Davies & Freedland, 2007). In 1998, the Working Time Regulations created potentially impor-
tant new rights to breaks and paid holidays, but weak enforcement mechanisms, almost wholly
reliant on the willingness and ability of individual workers to bring claims before employment
tribunals, significantly compromised the effectiveness of the rules (Hurrell, 2005).
The failure of modern employment law to lift hospitality and catering workers out of condi-
tions of low pay and precarity is fairly well documented (Pollert, 2007). Not only is the sub-
stance of the legal rules inadequate, rates of compliance are low (Metcalf, 2019). Major
breaches of the law, involving forced labour and the systematic non-payment of wages, may not
be widespread (French, 2018). As we will endeavour to demonstrate, however, minor
breaches—microviolations or microbreaches—are so frequent as to have become standard prac-
tice in the sector, akin to industry norms. Without a strong trade union presence or functional
equivalent along the lines of the old wages boards, moreover, these industry norms have come
to reflect, largely, the preferences of employers.
What is the relevance to the effectiveness of employment law as a means of protecting
workers from ill and unfair treatment of worker perceptions of the law and of fair and standard
practices at work? Findings from a series of 25 in-depth, semistructured interviews conducted
in 2019 with hospitality workers were consonant with the characterisation of microbreaches of
employment law as standard practice in that sector, more or less acceptable from the workers'
point of view. Further, these findings suggested that in the routinisation of microbreaches of
the law, worker perceptions of those practices as standard, and even fair, or at least not terribly
unfair, figure as both symptom and cause. If practices are common across different workplaces,
workers may become inured to them and stop expecting anything better. If workers do not per-
ceive breaches of their rights to be unjust, then the likelihood is further increased that breaches
will go unchallenged and become standard practice.
Our research was conducted before the outbreak of Covid-19 and the devastation to the sector
that has been caused by lockdown measures (Institute of Employment Rights, 2020). In the even-
tual aftermath of the pandemic, there may be opportunities for reform. With that hope in mind,
we suggest in conclusion that if employment law is to become effective, a dual pronged approach
is needed of both strengthening enforcement procedures and supporting the involvement of
workers collectively in rule-making. Such a dual pronged approach could replace a vicious circle
with a virtual one, involving the realignment of social norms and formal legal norms through the
empowerment of workers and the gradual improvement of terms and conditions.
2 | A TRANSIENT WORKFORCE
The UK hospitality and catering sector is estimated to employ more than 3 million people, con-
stituting more than 9% of total employment (Lopez-Andreu et al., 2019). In the last decade, it
has expanded at a faster pace than the rest of the economy, and part-time work, especially
under 0-h contracts, is substantially higher than the national average. Subcontracting and
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outsourcing practices have increased in recent years exacerbating the precariousness of employ-
ment. Although microestablishments employing 0–9 workers comprise the majority of enter-
prises, the trend in the last decade has been the decrease of microestablishments and the
increase of larger establishments of all other sizes (Green & Owen, 2019; Lopez-Andreu
et al., 2019). Taken as a whole, the sector is dominated by brands and franchises, so that many
small, even microenterprises, enterprises are really part of big multinational chains with unified
management structures from middle level and above.
The workforce in the sector is overwhelmingly young, including a substantial proportion of
students (Warhurst & Nickson, 2007). A quarter of total employment in hospitality is composed
of non-UK citizens, from both EU and non-EU countries, and this is much more enhanced in
‘back of house’ occupations. Hospitality jobs are typically low paid, at or just above the mini-
mum wage and are considered low skilled. There are very few barriers to entry into the sector,
likewise to exit, and many workers consider it an easy way to earn money while studying, or
until they decide what else they want to do, or as a stop gap until they find other, better employ-
ment (Lloyd & Payne, 2018). While employed in the sector, it is customary for workers to
change employers frequently. The high turnover constitutes a structural obstacle to building
workplace-rooted collective identities and an established trade union group that can act at the
company level and above.
The sector also employs professionals, meaning those with formal training who rise to posi-
tions of responsibility and management. Until these professionals are promoted to salaried
managerial positions, however, they tend not to be treated differently by the employers to other,
non-formally trained workers. Moreover, these professionals also tend to change employers fre-
quently, if not for better workplace climate and conditions, then for the accumulation of learn-
ing and experience. Unlike other industries where job titles and job posts correspond to
assumed differentiated skill levels or where a variation of terms and conditions of employment
is operative across different types of firms, locations and market niches, hospitality is a sector
characterised by an essentially flat workforce structure. As a service sector organised around
constant social interaction, its employment relations are structured in part by the nature of rela-
tions between co-workers and managers at any given workplace. This often leads to interper-
sonal dynamics having a disproportionate influence on how rights and obligations are
allocated, experienced and enforced.
Collective bargaining is non-existent at sectoral level and negligible at company level. The
unionisation rate is very low, estimated at between 3% and 4%. Right across the United Kingdom,
trade unionism has been in retreat for four decades for a variety of structural, historical and
political reasons. As a result, workers have become increasingly more dependent on the law for
protection of their rights. Since the 1980s, employment relations have been shaped by the
decline of industry and the rise of service sectors, the privatisation of public services, anti-trade
union legislation and the near disappearance of sectoral-level multi-employer bargaining
(Waddington, 2019). Certain features of the hospitality sector combine to offer a partial
explanation of why union membership levels are especially low there, including the prevalence of
young workers, seasonal fluctuations in demand, the transient nature of employment and the
smallness of the vast majority of employers. That said, comparison with other countries, where
union membership and collective bargaining coverage in hospitality are much higher, suggests
that there is nothing inevitable about this (Ioannou, 2015; Papadopoulos & Lyddon, 2020).1 While
recruiting young, precariously employed workers is a difficult task, there is increasing willingness
on the part of trade unions to devote resources to this, engaging in innovative organising efforts
to address young workers' interests (Simms et al., 2018).
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The absence of active trade unions and collective agreements in hospitality renders law the
main form of regulation of employment relations. Since the early part of the 20th century, radi-
cally different approaches have been taken to legal regulation ranging from sector-specific rules
and enforcement procedures to universally applicable statutory minima. In the 1920s, it was
attempted without success to create a trade board for the sector: a tripartite wage-setting body
that would compensate for the absence of collective bargaining (Bayliss, 1962). With Ernest
Bevin as Minister of Labour, and in recognition of the importance of catering to the war effort,
the Catering Wages Act of 1943 eventually provided for the creation of a set of wages boards,
each with responsibility for different parts of the sector. In the decades that followed, wages,
breaks and holidays were regulated by the boards, with the regulations enforced by a variety of
means including a dedicated labour inspectorate (Kahn-Freund, 1948). Importantly, minimum
wage rates were exclusive of tips (Albin, 2011). Evidence suggests that the wages boards system
was relatively successful in creating a floor of universally applicable rights (Bayliss, 1962,
p. 119), though, in the postwar context of full employment, wages tended to be rather higher
than the legal minima: ‘the state of the labour market was a more potent force in determining
pay levels’ (Commission of Industrial Relations, 1971, p. 22). In the 1980s, the role of the boards
was narrowed in line with the deregulatory agenda of the Conservatives under Margaret
Thatcher (Wood, 1992, pp. 38–42), and in 1993, they were abolished outright. Wages and other
terms and conditions were henceforth to be determined primarily by individual employers with
no legal limitation of the rate of pay.
During the period in office of the Labour Party under Tony Blair, vulnerable workers were
defined generally as those for whom, ‘the risk of being denied employment rights is high and
who [do] not have the capacity or means to protect themselves from that abuse’ (Department of
Trade and Industry [DTI], 2006, p. 25). On the basis of this definition, the Trades Union
Congress (TUC) estimated that as many as one fifth of all UK workers were vulnerable
(TUC, 2006). In terms of addressing that vulnerability, the most significant steps taken by the
government involved the creation of new statutory employment rights granted across all sectors
to all ‘workers’—a category that included not only employees, in the strict legal sense of the
term, but also casual workers and those on 0-h contracts: dependent contractors. In 1998,
the NMWA created a new minimum of £3.60 per hour, to be adjusted upwards periodically by a
tripartite ‘Low Pay Commission’. So low was the rate of £3.60, however, that, even for those
working full-time, it required to be supplemented by tax credits in order to amount to a living
wage (Davies & Freedland, 2007). Initially, the legislation allowed for tips paid through the pay
roll to count towards the minimum wage; since 2009, however, it has been stipulated in law
that the national minimum must be paid exclusive of tips (Albin, 2011). In implementation of a
directive of the European Union, the Working Time Regulations created rights to breaks—
including a break of at least 20 min after 6 h of work and another of 11 h between periods of
work—and to 4 weeks' paid holidays per year. With regard to the directive's upper limit
of 48 working hours per week, the Regulations provided that individual workers could choose
to ‘opt-out’. In practice, opt-outs became standard terms of contracts for work, presented to job
applicants on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (Barnard et al., 2003).
In respect of the national minimum wage, the Inland Revenue was given an inspectorate
role and associated powers to recover wage arrears on behalf of workers (Davies &
Freedland, 2007). For most other employment rights, including rights to breaks and holiday
pay, enforcement relied solely on the willingness of aggrieved individuals to bring claims before
employment tribunals. At the same time as it created new employment rights, however, the
Labour Government implemented a number of changes to the tribunal system designed
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specifically to make it less accessible to workers, ostensibly so as to reduce the number of ‘vexa-
tious’ claims as well as the overall cost to the taxpayer (Pollert, 2007). As a result, workers who
did seek external help for workplace grievances were often left isolated and their cases were
inadequately addressed (Pollert, 2010). Targeted action was taken to protect the absolutely most
vulnerable in agriculture and associated sectors only, with the introduction of a ‘gangmaster’—
or labour provider—licensing regime (Davies, 2014). When the regime proved relatively suc-
cessful in protecting workers from exploitation and abuse, calls were made for its extension
from agriculture to other low-paid sectors, including hospitality (TUC, 2013). To date, these
have gone unheeded.
Since 2010, and notwithstanding several changes of the government, policy objectives in
respect of vulnerable workers have essentially followed the course set under New Labour
(Mustchin & Martinez Lucio, 2020). On paper, all workers in all sectors have a set of statutory
rights including rights to a minimum wage, paid holidays and breaks; in practice, a significant
proportion may find that their rights are routinely breached (Davies, 2019). State enforcement
of employment law continues to target only the absolutely most vulnerable workers and egre-
gious breaches of the law, now through a Director of Labour Market Enforcement, which has
oversight of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, the national minimum wage com-
pliance team within HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and a third agency with responsibility
for employment agencies (Davies, 2016). In principle, individual workers whose rights are
breached may bring a claim before an employment tribunal; in practice, there are many reasons
why they are unlikely to do so, including significant financial and emotional costs, real and
imagined (Kirk, 2018). Between 2013 and 2017, the institution of fees for cases brought to tribu-
nals created an additional hurdle for those contemplating this route (Kirk, 2018), until the fees
regime was judged unlawful by the Supreme Court as a barrier to workers' access to justice
(Ford, 2018). In the 20 years since the NMWA came into force, meanwhile, the minimum wage,
which continues to amount to little more than a subsistence wage, has become a ‘going rate’ or
‘ceiling’ for many workers, rather than a floor: the most that they can realistically expect to
earn (Puttick, 2019). This is particularly the case in low-pay sectors including hospitality.
According to Green and Owen (2019), the most frequent breaches of workers' rights in the
restaurant and food and beverage sectors concern the underpayment of wages, long working
hours, and insufficient holiday entitlement and rest breaks. Non-compliance with the law is
usually a result, they argue, of one or more of three distinct conditions: (a) ignorance of the
detail of the law on the part of workers and sometimes employers, (b) collusion between
workers and employers and (c) conscious exploitation of workers by their employers. In respect
of the hotel sector, similar observations are made by Lopez-Andreu et al. (2019). Both studies
recognise that as workers are left to enforce their rights individually rather than collectively,
they often hesitate to start a formal complaints procedure, fearing negative repercussions or
deeming it not worth the ‘hassle’. The casual nature of employment is a key factor shaping
workers' increasingly common decision to accept minor employment rights' breaches as an ele-
ment of the job. When the threshold of toleration is passed, exit is overwhelmingly preferred to
the exercise of voice (Hirschman, 1970).
3 | SOCIAL NORMS AND LEGAL NORMS AT WORK
In exploring the limits of employment law as a means of protecting workers from ill or unfair
treatment at the hands of employing organisations, a key question that falls to be addressed is
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whether the applicable legal rules are routinely respected by employers—complied with, either
intentionally or incidentally—or, alternatively, frequently, or even routinely, breached
(Parker & Lehmann Nielsen, 2011). Non-compliance is not only difficult to address and remedy,
it is also difficult to investigate. Complaints data can grossly under-represent the true level of
breaches, and administrative data are fragmented and subject to biases, suggesting a need for
specialised worker surveys complemented by in-depth interviews (Cockbain et al., 2019).
Compliance is rarely a clear-cut, one-off event but rather a process of negotiation over time,
influenced by the relationship between the regulators and the regulated, the legal and the
organisational environment, and determined by economic, political and social contexts
(Edelman & Talesh, 2011; Hutter, 2011). One of the things that must be taken into consider-
ation when addressing questions of compliance or non-compliance with formal legal rules is the
possible existence of informal social norms and of beliefs shared by affected actors, and groups
of actors, regarding what is expected, or fair or just in any particular situation (Dukes, 2019;
Dukes & Streeck, 2020). Social norms stand in a complex relation with formal law. In some
cases, legal rules may have their origins in social norms or practices, for example, where ele-
ments of ‘custom and practice’ are held by the courts to be legally binding or where the terms
of collective agreements are accorded legal force by reason of a court ruling or statutory provi-
sion. Where legal rules and social norms are at odds with each other, on the other hand, so that
the former are perceived by those affected to be unfair or unrealistic, breach of the law may go
unchallenged in a manner that undermines, over time, its efficacy and legitimacy. It is also pos-
sible that the substance of applicable legal rules may shape workers' perceptions of what is fair
in a given situation. The ‘knowledgeability’ of social and economic action is invested, we might
say, with legal notions and concepts, even if these are apprehended by the actors themselves in
the guise of practices, routines or shared understandings that are only dimly reminiscent of the
legal rule from which they originally stem (Knegt, 2018).
In the earlier parts of the 20th century, when systems of collective bargaining were being
constructed, policy arguments emphasised the relative effectiveness of collective bargaining as a
means of rule creation and rule enforcement. In modern industrial society, so it was said, the
legal system alone—the legislature and the courts—could not possibly keep pace with industrial
change, including changes in institutional conditions and opportunities (Davies &
Freedland, 1983, p. 58). It followed that formal legal rules should be primarily procedural in
nature, opening the law up to the reality of industrial and working life by delegating substantive
rule-making largely to properly constituted organisations of the ‘two sides of industry’: the
buyers and sellers of labour. With changing circumstances shaping and reshaping the interests,
claims and willingness of the parties to make concessions, collective bargaining could result in
rules with a far greater potential than formal law to secure industrial peace—or, rather, an
industrial truce until the next round of joint rule setting, in response to the most recent changes
in industrial circumstances or political power relations.
Collective institutions and processes were also argued to be superior when it came to the
enforcement of norms, whether collectively negotiated, legislatively enacted or judicially
decreed (Davies & Freedland, 1983, p. 19). Where unions are represented at the workplace, they
can act as ever-present inspectorates, shielding individual workers from any potentially hostile
reaction on the part of the employer by speaking with one collective voice. In the case of
infringement by the employer, the union can negotiate rectification and/or compensation.
Where enforcement of a legal norm relies on individual litigation, the union can provide moral,
financial and practical support to the worker, including legal advice. Because the union's capac-
ity to act in these respects relies largely on its ability to threaten or take industrial action—its
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‘social power’—a further argument arises here in support of collective norm setting: the
enforcement of norms is facilitated if it can draw on a (collective) sense of grievance among
workers in their respective occupational communities and if the norms in question are
grounded in the workers' sense of justice.
With the disappearance of collective bargaining and collective means of enforcement from
many parts of the economy—and in the case of hospitality, the abolition of the wages boards
and associated inspectorate—formal rule-making has become a matter for parliament and the
courts alone, far removed from the workplace and rather less open to the incorporation of social
norms and shared interests. The centralisation of wage setting and the preference for univer-
sally applicable standards has resulted in the creation of legal rules that may not be very well
tailored to the specifics of work organisation in particular sectors or employing organisations
(Dukes & Streeck, 2020). Although social norms and shared interests remain important today
for their potential impact on compliance with and the enforcement of formal law, it is equally
important to recognise and take account of the changed context within which they have been
shaped and solidified. Certain features of hospitality are of enduring significance and here we
would emphasise in particular: fluctuating demand and the potential importance of tips to
worker remuneration. We would also wish to emphasise the importance in this respect, how-
ever, of the sometimes rapidly changing power relations between workers and employers, as
structured by prevailing labour market conditions, the absence of trade unions and wages
boards, weak employment law protections and the reshaping of social welfare entitlements in
line with active labour market policies.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: METHODS AND SAMPLE
During 2019, 25 in-depth, semistructured interviews were conducted with young workers in
Scotland and the north of England, including some trade union members and full-time union
employees. All interviews were individual, audio recorded, and subsequently transcribed and
subjected to content analysis. Interviews concerned three major themes indicated to inter-
viewees in advance: (a) terms and conditions of employment in current and past jobs; (b) the
experience and consequence of these terms and conditions of employment on their personal,
economic and social lives; and (c) their views and ideas about worker rights and their enforce-
ment. The precise framing of the questions, the topics and the emphasis given to each was
adapted in line with the age, current role, employment trajectory and experience of each inter-
viewee. The interviews typically began with a discussion of the current job and employment tra-
jectory and, on the basis of that discussion, focused more specifically on interesting instances or
examples and on industry practices, norms and views about how things could be improved. An
emphasis was placed on the employment history of the interviewees, and they were prompted
to draw on their whole working life trajectory in their responses. The worker narratives were
used to identify both ‘facts’ and ‘norms’, meaning both specific events that took place during
their employment and also the workers' opinions, beliefs and values, as they were prompted to
reflect and comment on these. Content analysis for the purposes of this paper involved the sin-
gling out of all direct and indirect references to rules, rights and customs and the selection of
the most indicative examples.
Most interviewees were based in Glasgow, but some came from or had also worked in
other cities in Scotland and northern England. Two had worked in the hospitality sector in
the United States and Australia and were able to make comparative observations. The sample
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was balanced in terms of gender and age including workers in their early 20s, late 20s and
early 30s. Around half of the interviewees had completed university education, whereas one
fifth had specialised hospitality professional training. Interviewees came from a diverse set of
occupations working front of house in cafes, restaurants, bars and nightclubs and in hotels
and food delivery. Some were cooks and kitchen porters, a few had worked in additional sec-
tors such as retail and care work, some were also students at the time of the interview,
whereas three had or had previously had managerial positions in a restaurant, bar and
kitchen, respectively. A balance was sought and achieved in terms of the type of employing
organisation, with the sample including big national and multinational chains, small and
medium independent businesses, family businesses and microbusinesses. Some of the workers
had worked casually through agencies in catering, whereas one had moved after many years
in the sector into self-employment.
Multiple methods of recruitment to the interviews were utilised including suggestions via
social contacts and trade unionists, snowballing, advertisements in printed posters and social
media posts in several relevant pages and groups. The overwhelming majority of interviewees
were non-unionised, reflecting the prevailing trend in the sector. The interviews with trade
unionists included both permanent experienced organisers and newly recruited young temporary
staff, and in all cases, not only their trade union roles but also their own employment trajectory
in the hospitality sector was discussed. In recognition of participants' low pay, some were offered
token compensation for their time.2 As a small, qualitative sample from a small geographical area,
this is not in any way representative of the whole sector. It is, however, indicative of broader
trends as is evidenced by the fact that its main findings correspond closely with the findings of
research commissioned by the Director of Labour Market Enforcement to inform the Annual
Strategy 2019/2020 (Green & Owen, 2019; Lopez-Andreu et al., 2019; Wishart et al., 2019).
5 | FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 | Non-compliance as standard practice
There's not really a good kind of structure to how to, you know, even learn about
what you're entitled to. You know, there's not a lot of people don't actually look for
the information that is available. I think, just in general, it's a pretty shoddy indus-
try in terms of the law and what applies to the employees that work within that
industry, like things like zero-hour contracts. (Bar Worker 1)
In the cases we examined, core rights such as the right to a minimum wage were formally
respected, work was declared for tax purposes and working hours tended to be largely the result
of agreement. When the employment relation was examined in the round, however, areas of
‘greyness’ and uncertainty became apparent in respect of the workers' legal rights. Although
the situation varied from worker to worker and from one establishment to another, almost all
the interviewees were able to narrate at least some instances whereby they themselves or their
friends and colleagues experienced rights' breaches. These included under-recording of worked
hours, indefinite postponement of payment of wages, loss of some holiday pay and insufficient
rest breaks. Some respondents also mentioned favouritism in the rota, confiscating tips to com-
pensate the employer for damage to property, verbal bullying by managers and forced resigna-
tions by way of the gradual decrease of working hours.
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Although most of the respondents experienced in their various hospitality jobs several
inspections by the authorities, concerning music, alcohol, food hygiene and the condition of
premises, none had ever witnessed an inspection related directly to employment matters. ‘There
are licences and people to check on every single aspect of hospitality, but nobody checks on the
employment status or the employment rights or the employment conditions’ (Nightclub
Worker 1). It was clear to the workers that in the absence of an interventionist state and given
the marginality of trade unions in the sector, protection of their interests and employment
rights would be down to them alone. ‘In all of my jobs at some point I have been underpaid
and because I've always had the log to go back and be like no I worked this exact time and so
I've got my own records’ (Nightclub Worker 2).
Many respondents were broadly aware of their basic rights but less so of the specifics
of the law and the avenues available to them to seek redress. The bigger issue was not
insufficient knowledge of the law, however, but the limited belief in its enforceability and
the practical utilisation of the law in the everyday work context. The right, for example,
not to opt out of the Working Time Directive's 48 h/week maximum is very significantly
undermined by the possibility of an individual opt-out. ‘So, you waive the right to not
work a close and an open so it might be the case that you know you finish at three o'clock
the next day and you're back in at nine … it's quite difficult to say no to that again
because whenever you're going through your contract you're sitting in front of your man-
ager and there's a lot of pressure on you to just sign it’ (Bar Worker 2). An analogous
pressure can be applied in cases when the customers are fewer than anticipated and
workers who arrive for their allocated shift are told to go back home without pay.
Although there may be a contractual right to refuse this ad hoc change to hours, in reality,
the pressure to waive that right and ‘voluntarily’ accept the change can be too great to
resist, especially for newly recruited and younger workers.
Most respondents described experiences where workers raised issues with their managers,
some of which were resolved internally. Where there was no resolution of the matter internally,
workers were hesitant to take it further, involving external agencies such as the Citizen Advice
Bureaux and the Employment Tribunals. Phrases such as ‘having the guts’ and ‘going up
against this big company’ kept popping up when prompted to explain their reluctance to seek
external help for rights' enforcement. The commonly held belief was that these are for bigger
things, not for petty, everyday stuff. In any case, outcomes would be uncertain. ‘It's not worth
going through all that hassle to maybe just maybe be told you know there was some sort of
loophole that the employer's used to avoid this’ (kitchen worker). The modest nature of avail-
able remedies was also dissuasive: the fact that after a great deal of time, effort and possibly
money had been expended to substantiate one's case about breach of the law, only a small sum
of compensation would be payable by the employer.
Compliance with, or breach of, employment law proceeds within a context that is shaped,
above all, by a structural power imbalance between employers and individualised workers. In
the prevailing conditions of high turnover within the sector, and the diffusion of part-time work
and especially 0-h contracts, the law concerning redundancies and dismissals is insufficient to
provide the majority of workers with even basic protection. Some respondents narrated exam-
ples of workers who fell out of a manager's favour, and their working hours were gradually
reduced until they resigned. ‘If they have a zero hours contract then they will just get zero
hours, you know’ (ex-hospitality worker). This possibility looms large in the background and
can operate as a disciplinary mechanism dissuading workers from demanding that their rights
be respected. ‘So, you can have ten workers to cover one job technically so you can have ten
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workers basically hanging at the end of their phone waiting for a shift rather than having one
worker and if that one worker then challenges you or doesn't make it in then but if you've got
ten there you've always got someone on call, on tap basically to fill a space’ (trade union orga-
niser). An older, more experienced restaurant worker admitted that this could happen but also
called attention to the possibility that the threat might be exaggerated; it could be a case of
‘younger workers projecting their fears’ rather than a standard managerial practice in the
sector.
5.2 | A culture of toleration of breach of the law
There is laws of you have to have, I don't know, ten hours in-between a shift or
something like that but it doesn't work like that because [laughs] I've just found it's
been, it's short staffed. In the places that I've worked it's been having not enough
staff to do that. (Hotel worker)
We did not encounter major human rights breaches in our fieldwork, such as forced labour
or the systematic non-payment of wages, nor, however, did we specifically search for them.
Focusing our investigation on the relationship of precariousness with statutory employment
rights in the lived experiences of young hospitality workers, our key finding was rather a
multiplicity of microbreaches of various rights. Concerning the right to breaks, for example,
although some interviewees did get their breaks or had in the past worked in places where
breaks were offered, most reported that their ability to take a rest break during a long shift
depended straightforwardly on how busy the establishment was. Some reported that they were
offered breaks at the beginning or the end of their shifts when customers were fewer, and not
when they needed it, that is, in the middle of the shift. One reported that although breaks were
offered, there was only a tiny room with one chair where one felt ‘miserable’, and most
preferred to take their breaks in a corridor, where they remained visible to the manager and
liable to be directed at any point to ‘go do something’. Another interviewee mentioned that in
the kitchens, breaks are unknown unless you're a smoker, in which case the chef lets you away
for 5-min cigarette breaks in quieter moments. Where an employment practice comes to be
established as a norm, then deviation from the norm can also carry social sanctions. ‘It's almost
always seen if there's somebody in a bar that says, oh I've been working for six hours I need a
break, that person is automatically like eyed out as like a troublemaker, do you know what I
mean? It's like, that guy's like, oh keep an eye on him you know, like it's like everyone else just
does it but this guy wants his human rights, you know, and it's like’ (Bar Worker 3).
In the context of individualised employment relations, these microbreaches tend to be too
unimportant, of themselves, for the worker to consider that it is worth the trouble to contest
them. For an employer employing numerous workers, however, the cumulative effect of these
could be economically quite significant. Non-payment of small amounts of wages, such as an
unpaid hour per week, a couple of days' less holiday pay in a year and a few unpaid trial shifts,
can add up. If committed systematically over a long period of time, in a time frame much longer
than the one individualised workers operate within, they can impact quite significantly on costs
and profitability, helping to alleviate the overwhelming competitive pressures characteristic of
the sector (Green & Owen, 2019; Lopez-Andreu et al., 2019). Some of these ‘microthefts’ may
be accidental, a result of bad organisation and occasional rather than systematic. In such cases,
they are more likely to be rectified if contested. In other cases, microbreaches may go unnoticed
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and perhaps intentionally so. Where managers initially commit to rectifying the breaches, they
may subsequently ‘forget’ to do so. ‘There has been some places that I've been in that they've
not gave me my holiday pay and I've just thought to myself this is a losing battle just accept the
fact that you're not going to get your holiday pay just go to another job and hope that it's better’
(kitchen worker).
The transient composition of the workforce in hospitality both facilitates the microbreach of
employment rights and provides, more importantly, the mechanism through which they gradu-
ally come to be taken for granted. Employers do not make efforts to retain their staff on a long-
term basis, with the exception, perhaps of key personnel such as managers and chefs who tend
to be salaried. Given the ease with which a hospitality job can be secured, meanwhile, hourly
paid workers are frequently unwilling to ‘put up a fight’ in their workplace, preferring instead
to leave and find employment elsewhere. Over time, a mutual understanding arises that the
employment relation is anyway unlikely to last long. ‘It's all they've always worked in a kind of
weird sort of kind of almost liquid like basis where they can come, they can leave quite easily
but they can get sacked quite easily’ (restaurant worker). Temporariness becomes a prevailing
sense in hospitality, a lived reality that at the same time informs understanding and conscious-
ness. A social process is at work whereby a material reality shapes subjective experience, which
in turn impacts again on material reality. In a context of individualised employment relations,
exit becomes a more rational choice for the individual worker than remaining in the current
job and attempting to effect positive change.
The multitude of individual acts that feed into and sustain a vicious circle of transience is a
social process, mediated by social dynamics and determined by actual and perceived managerial
pressure, as well as peer pressure. This social process lies at the border between fact and norm,
connecting the two, translating and transforming the one into the other in both directions. Our
fieldwork suggests that employment law does not play a central role in this process. On the one
hand, it seems unable to command comprehensive compliance, and on the other, it is unable
even to shape in an organic way the consciousness of hospitality workers and their subjective
orientations. Breaking this vicious circle, and utilising employment law as an instrument with
which to strengthen worker rights and their enforcement in hospitality, would require parallel
action both from above and from below. Close monitoring and improvement of the regulatory
context through setting up sectoral-level structures would need to be accompanied and comple-
mented by processes encouraging and facilitating the collectivisation of the experience in hospi-
tality work. Trade unionism and collective bargaining remain indispensable, yet in order to
take root in the sector, they need to take into account the transience of hospitality employment,
both attune and respond to its routines and customs in order to become relevant and effective
in shaping the field.
6 | CONCLUSION
Twentieth-century ideas regarding the desirability of opening up formal law to social norms, and
to the particular conceptions of justice that may be shared across groups, sectors or occupations,
are of enduring force. The closer formal legal rules are aligned with commonly held ideas of what
is fair and what is expected behaviour in any given context, the more likely it becomes that those
legal rules will be complied with by employers and enforced by workers. Focusing on hospitality
and catering in the United Kingdom, this article illustrated the distance between workers' formal
legal rights and prevailing conditions of employment as these have evolved over time. It
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demonstrated the limits of employment law in a context in which microbreaches of the law have
become standard practice, fostering a culture of toleration of breach of the law and relativising its
normative force. Although hospitality and catering were never unionised in the United Kingdom,
the wages boards ensured union involvement in the setting and enforcement of minimum stan-
dards. Since their abolition, employment in the sector has slowly deteriorated.
Within systems of employment law, universally applicable legal minima may be highly
desirable as elements of a floor of rights (Wedderburn, 1986): basic protections enjoyed by
all workers regardless of the type of contract they have and the sector within which they
work. Of themselves, however, universally applicable rules may be inadequate, lacking a
good fit, across the board, with the particularities and characteristics of specific sectors and
workplaces, and, as such, less likely to be complied with and enforced. Over time, they
may exert a downwards pressure on the setting of wages and other terms and conditions,
coming to function as a ceiling rather than a floor. For these reasons, it may be argued
that universal statutory minima should be supplemented by sector-specific machinery for
rule-making and enforcement, capable of tailoring rules to the realities of work organisa-
tion, industry and labour force characteristics and prevailing labour market conditions
(Ewing et al., 2016).
It is also important to emphasise, however, that recognition of the complex interaction of
formal legal rules with social practices, social norms and shared beliefs does not imply that the
former should simply be aligned to the latter. Existing practices in hospitality are problematic,
constructed within a context of gross structural inequalities between individualised workers
and employing organisations and largely reflective, therefore, of the preferences of the latter. A
dual pronged approach of both strengthening enforcement procedures and facilitating the
involvement of workers collectively in rule-making has the potential to replace a vicious circle
with a virtuous one, involving the gradual improvement of terms and conditions and the
empowerment of workers.
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ENDNOTES
1 Sectoral collective bargaining exists in hospitality in several European countries. In addition to Scandinavian
countries where trade union density and collective bargaining coverage are generally high, most workers in big
hotels in Southern Europe are covered by sectoral collective agreements.
2 After initial attempts to recruit participants produced modest results, it was decided that a £20 gift voucher
would be offered to each participant before the interview commenced to assist the recruitment process. Ethics
approval for this was secured, and costs were covered by the project's research budget.
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